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ERISA Preemption of State Vacation Pay Laws:
CaliforniaHospital Association v. Henning
INTRODUCTION

When Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA" or "the Act"),1 popularly known as
the pension reform bill,2 one of the Act's sponsors called it "the
greatest development in the life of the American worker since so4
cial security." 3 ERISA is a comprehensive remedial statute
designed to protect the interests of workers and their beneficiaries
in earned pension and welfare benefit plans.5 Little did the statute's proponents realize, however, that nine years after the passage
of ERISA, a group of California employer associations would
transform the statute's protective shield against loss of pension and
welfare benefits into a weapon to strike down state protection of
workers' earned vacation pay. 6
For several years, ERISA coexisted peacefully with California
Labor Code section 227.3, which prohibited forfeiture of vested vacation time upon termination of employment. 7 In 1982, however,
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 and in
various sections of 18, 19, and 26 U.S.C. (1982)).
2. See S. Porter, Your Money's Worth: Pension Reform at Last, Washington StarNews, Aug. 5, 1974, reprinted in 3 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

3. 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Javits), reprintedin 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 4747. At the bill signing ceremony, President Ford remarked: "I think this is really an historic Labor Day-historic in the sense that this
legislation will probably give more benefits and rights and success in the area of labormanagement than almost anything in the history of this country." 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 5321.
4. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
5. ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). See Gordon v. ILWU-PMA Benefit Funds,
616 F.2d 433, 437 (9th Cir. 1980); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d
729, 731 (9th Cir. 1978); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390, 403 (S.D. Ala. 1982);
LeFebre v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (D. Md. 1982); Brink v.
DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350, 1367 (D. Md. 1980); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485
F. Supp. 629, 634 (W.D. Wis. 1979); Marshall v. Kelly, 465 F. Supp. 341, 349 (W.D.
Okla. 1978); Hunacek v. Union Welfare Fund Local 202, 100 Misc. 2d 740, 742, 420
N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
6. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-6381 and No. 83-6416 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 1983).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (West Supp. 1984). Section 227.3 provides as follows:
Unless otherwise provided by a collective-bargaining agreement, whenever a
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the California Supreme Court, in Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co.,'
unanimously held that section 227.3's anti-forfeiture provision required employers to pay a pro rata share of vacation pay to employees who were terminated prior to becoming eligible for full
vacations.9 A group of employer associations reacted to this apparent expansion of the law 10 by filing an amicus curiae petition
requesting that Suastez be reheard. The associations argued for the
first time that Labor Code section 227.3 was preempted by
ERISA." After the California Supreme Court denied the request
for rehearing, 12 the associations filed suit in federal district court to
enjoin state labor officials from enforcing section 227.3 and Suastez.13 In this action by the associations, CaliforniaHospitalAssociation v. Henning, 4 the court issued a permanent injunction which
not only held section 227.3 preempted by ERISA but also barred
the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement from involving itself in any way with any claim against
any employer con5
cerning vacation plans, funds, or programs.'
Henning focused on state regulation of vacation payments from
contract of employment or employer policy provides for paid vacations, and an
employee is terminated without having taken off his vested vacation time, all
vested vacation shall be paid to him as wages at his final rate in accordance with
such contract of employment or employer policy respecting eligibility or time
served; provided, however, that an employment contract or employer policy
shall not provide for forfeiture of vested vacation time upon termination. The
Labor Commissioner or a designated representative, in the resolution of any
dispute with regard to vested vacation time, shall apply the principles of equity
and fairness.
8. 31 Cal. 3d 774, 647 P.2d 122, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982).
9. 31 Cal. 3d at 784, 647 P. 2d at 128, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
10. See cases cited infra note 142.
11. Opening Brief of Appellant at 3, California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, No. 83-6381
and No. 83-6416 (9th Cir. July 26, 1984).
12. Suastez, 31 Cal. 3d at 784, 647 P.2d at 128, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
The plaintiffs were the California Hospital Association, California Restaurant Association, California Manufacturers Association, California Chamber of Commerce,
Merchants and Manufacturers Association, and the California Hotel and Motel Association. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544, 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
13. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction at 25, 26, California Hosp.
Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
14. 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
15. Judgment at 3, 4, California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, No. 82-6659 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 12, 1983).
On appeal, the California labor commissioner objected to the breadth of the court's
order, which granted relief not just to employers represented by the plaintiff associations
but to all California employers not excluded from ERISA coverage. The district court
thus granted class-action relief without ever having been presented with a motion for
class certification under FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Opening Brief for Appellant at 44, California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, No. 83-6381 and No. 83-6416 (9th Cir. July 26, 1984).
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employers' general assets ("nontrusteed plans"). The court held
that such payments constituted ERISA-covered "plans" or "programs," 16 despite the failure of such arrangements to comply with
ERISA's requirement that plan assets be placed in a trust ("trusteed plans"). 17 The court refused to defer to a United States Department of Labor regulation which excluded vacation payments
from general assets from ERISA coverage. 8 Finally, the court
held that California's vacation pay laws and administrative procedure for adjudicating vacation pay claims fell within ERISA's preemption provisions because the laws and procedures "relate to"
benefit plans. 19
The outcome in Henning illustrates the extent to which the federal government may preempt state regulation of a field which
Congress has chosen to occupy. After a brief description of
ERISA coverage, this note will review the preemption doctrine and
examine judicial efforts to define the scope of ERISA preemption.
Next, this note will discuss the Henning decision that ERISA supersedes both state regulation of vacation pay practices and state
administrative enforcement of vacation pay obligations. After examining the potential impact of Henning, this note will suggest a
way to give full force to ERISA's preemption of the employee benefit field while preserving for the states their traditional role in labor standards enforcement.
BACKGROUND

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
ERISA was enacted to protect certain employee pension and
welfare benefit rights. 20 To achieve this goal, Congress established
a comprehensive scheme of substantive and procedural requirements designed to assure the equitable character and financial
soundness of employee benefit plans. 21 The Act imposes on all em16. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1983). See ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1) (1982); see infra notes 171-219 and accompanying text.
17. ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982); see infra notes 174-78 and accompanying
text.
18. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1 (1984); see infra notes 200-19 and accompanying text.
19. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544, 1547 (C.D. Cal. 1983); ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1982); see infra notes 220-46 and accompanying text.
20. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
21. ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982), provides in relevant part:
The Congress finds . . . that it is . . . desirable in the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the United States,
and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be pro-
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ployee benefit plans 22 reporting and disclosure requirements 23 and

standards of fiduciary responsibility. 24 ERISA also establishes
minimum participation, vesting and funding requirements which
apply only to pension plans.2 ' The statute provides for administra26
tion and enforcement through internal plan claims procedures
and both civil 27 and criminal 28 court action.

The existence of an "employee benefit plan" 29 is a prerequisite to
ERISA coverage" and thus a threshold question in any preemption challenge.3 The Act defines "employee benefit plan" to include both employee pension benefit plans and employee welfare
benefit plans.32 It further defines welfare benefit plan as "any plan,
fund or program" which provides ERISA-covered benefits such as
medical care, apprenticeship training, and vacation benefits. 3 The
statute is unclear, however, as to what constitutes a "plan" or
vided assuring the equitable character of such [employee benefit] plans and their
financial soundness.
22. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982), defines "employee benefit plan" as "an
employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both
... " ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982) defines "employee welfare benefit
plan" as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or
day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit
described in section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such
pensions).
23. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1982).
24. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982).
25. ERISA §§ 201-211, 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061, 1081-1086 (1982).
26. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1982).
27. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982).
28. ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (1982).
29. See supra note 22.
30. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1369 (11 th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Petrella
v. NL Indus. Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (D.N.J. 1982); Jervis v. Elerding, 504 F.
Supp. 606, 608 (C.D. Cal. 1980); see also Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196
(D. Ariz. 1977). See generally Goodman & Stone, Exempt Compensation Arrangements
Under ERISA, 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 445, 452-53 (1979).
31. Kilberg & Heron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA, 1979 DUKE L.J.
383, 390 (1979).
32. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982); see supra note 22.
33. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982); see supra note 22.
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"program. 1 34 In Donovan v. Dillingham, 35 the Eleventh Circuit
held that an ERISA plan or program had to include intended benefits, intended beneficiaries, a source of funding, and a procedure for
application and collection of benefits.36
The United States Department of Labor, which is responsible for
enforcing the provisions of Title I of ERISA, 37 also has attempted
to define the type of benefit practice that will constitute a plan or
program under the Act. In response to "numerous inquiries" regarding the scope of ERISA coverage, 38 the Department promulgated a regulation excluding from the definition of "welfare benefit
plan" payments of normal compensation from an employer's general assets for periods during which employees are on vacation.39
The regulation was issued under ERISA section 505's grant of authority to the Secretary of Labor to "prescribe such regulations as
he finds necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
chapter" and to "define accounting, technical, and trade terms
used in such provisions." °
The amount of deference which a court must give to a properly
enacted regulation, such as that promulgated by the Department of
Labor, depends upon whether the regulation is "legislative" or "in34. See Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(terms "not well defined").
35. 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
36. Id. at 1372.
37. ERISA § 502(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(5) (1982).
38. In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Department of Labor stated:
Since the enactment of the Act, the Labor Department has received numerous
inquiries relating to the coverage under Title I of the Act of various types of
practices of employers. This proposed section, issued under the authority of
section 505 of the Act, is designed to resolve some of the questions which have
been raised in these inquiries by clarifying the definition of the term "employee
benefit plan".
[P]aid vacations . . . are not treated as employee benefit plans because
they are associated with regular wages or salary. . . . Moreover, the abuses
which created the impetus for the reforms in Title I were not in this area, and
there is no indication that Congress intended to subject these practices to Title I
coverage.
40 Fed. Reg. 24,642-43 (1975).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b) (1984), provides in relevant part:
(b) Payrollpractices. For purposes of Title I of the Act and this chapter, the
terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" shall not include
(3) Payment of compensation, out of the employer's general assets, on account of periods of time during which the employee. . . performs no duties; for
example(i) Payment of compensation while an employee is on vacation. ...
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1982).
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terpretive. ' ' 41 While a valid legislative rule has the force of law,
courts sometimes substitute their own judgment for administrative
interpretations.42
A rule is "legislative" when Congress has delegated to the administrative agency the power to make law. 43 The grant of legislative authority need not be specific but must be such that a
"reviewing court reasonably [may] conclude that the grant of authority contemplates the regulation issued."" While an administrative agency cannot rewrite a statute,45 Congress may grant an
agency the authority to fill any gaps left by the statutory language. 46 Such an exercise of administrative "gap-filling" is accorded controlling weight unless the regulation
is "arbitrary,
47
capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.
Interpretive regulations also have considerable force when they
are enacted by agencies charged with the enforcement of the statute being interpreted.4" The Supreme Court has described as
"venerable" the principle that such regulations should be followed
"unless there are compelling indications that [they are] wrong. '49
This is particularly true when a regulation is adopted shortly after
enactment of the statute being interpreted. 50 An interpretive regulation is entitled to less deference when it can be judged against a
corresponding statutory definition.5 1
Prior to Henning, several courts had deferred to regulations of
the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury52 in deciding cases involving ERISA coverage.5 3 In fact, portions of the regulation at
41. K. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:8, at 36 (2d ed. 1979).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 39.
44. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1978).
45. Talley v. Matthews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977).
46. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
2778, 2782 (1984).
47. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) (deference
unless "demonstrably irrational"); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977) (regulation can be set aside only if "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law").
48. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
49. New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973); see also
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
50. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477
(1979).
51. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
52. The Secretary of the Treasury promulgates regulations relating to ERISA's tax
provisions. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1982).
53. Courts deferred to regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor in
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issue in Henning have been cited in decisions dealing with ERISA
coverage of accumulated sick leave 54 and severance pay.5"
The Doctrine of Preemption
Once Congress has legislated in a particular area, the supremacy
clause requires that federal law supersede or preempt conflicting
state law. 56 This principle mandates that a state law be rendered
void when compliance with both the federal and state law is impossible or when the state law defeats congressional purposes or
57
objectives.
Furthermore, Congress may exercise a plenary power such that
the federal scheme occupies an entire field to the exclusion of even
parallel or complementary state legislation. 8 Indeed, Congress
may choose to prohibit state regulation of a particular field even
though the federal scheme leaves the field completely unregulated.59 Congress may do this by explicitly forbidding state regulation, or it may imply occupation of the field in structuring or
Abella v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., 740 F.2d 4 (1984); Petrella v. NL Indus. Inc., 529
F. Supp. 1357 (D.N.J. 1982); Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 500 F Supp. 1162
(C.D. Cal. 1980); and Pinto v. Zenith Radio Corp., 480 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
aff'd mem., 618 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1980). Courts deferred to Treasury Department regulations in Swaida v. IBM Retirement Plan, 570 F. Supp. 482, affid, 728 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1984) (per curiam); and Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 609 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1979). See also
B. CREED, ERISA COMPLIANCE REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE 15-16 (1981).
In rejecting an ERISA preemption challenge to Illinois's vacation pay law, a federal
district court upheld the validity of the regulation which excluded vacation payments out
of general assets from the definition of "welfare benefit plan." The court noted that the
Department of Labor's interpretation of ERISA was entitled to "great weight." National
Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp. 232, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 851263 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 1985).
54. See, e.g., Abella v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., 740 F.2d 4, 5 (6th Cir. 1984).
55. See, e.g., Petrella v. NL Indus. Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (D.N.J. 1982); Pinto
v. Zenith Radio, 480 F. Supp. 361, 363 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affid mem., 618 F.2d 110 (7th
Cir. 1980); see also Sly v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 712 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1983); Dhayer v.
Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 571 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. W. Va. 1983); Donnelly
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides in relevant part: "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land." See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CON-

292-96 (2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 6-23 to 6-25 (1978); Hirsch, Toward a New View of FederalPreemption, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 515; Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
BurgerCourt, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975); Note, A Frameworkfor PreemptionAnalysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Preemption Analysis].
57. See Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54,
104 S. Ct. 3179, 3186 (1984); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984).
58. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 104
S. Ct. 3179, 3185-86 (1984); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984).
59. L. TRIBE, supra note 56, at 376-77.
STITUTIONAL LAW
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setting forth the purpose of its enactments. 6° Preemption will be
presumed where the scheme of federal regulation is pervasive or
the federal interest dominant. 6' Whether preemption of a particular field is express or implied, it often is difficult to define with any
certainty the exact boundaries of the field being preempted.62
No preemption will take place, however, if Congress has acted
unconstitutionally.63 When Congress exercises its plenary power
under the commerce clause, 64 courts will uphold federal regulation
of local activities against a constitutional challenge only if Congress has a "rational basis" for finding that the activities affect interstate commerce and chooses reasonable and appropriate means
to eliminate the evil it perceives.65
If federal regulation passes this "rational basis" test, it may tread
on ground traditionally occupied by the states in the exercise of the
"police powers" reserved to them by the tenth amendment.66
There is, however, a strong presumption against preemption of
these police powers, which will survive absent an unambiguous
congressional mandate that they be superseded by federal law.67
60. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 104
S. Ct. 3179, 3185 (1984); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236
(1947) ("Congress can act so unequivocally as to make clear that it intends no regulation
except its own.").
61. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (1983); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983); see
also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. DeLaCuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
62. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 23, 35 (1978); Turza &
Halloway, Preemption ofState Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 28 CATH.U.L. REv. 163, 179 (1979).
63. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
a.f'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
64. Congress enacted ERISA under its power under the commerce clause to "regulate Commerce. . . among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See ERISA § 2,
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (ERISA is necessary to protect interstate commerce).
65. See Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977), ajfd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th
Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to ERISA's
preemption provision); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
66. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 144-47 (1909), for a discussion of the tension
between the supremacy clause and the states' exercise of police powers. These powers
generally include state efforts to promote and protect the public health, safety, morals,
comfort, convenience, and general welfare. Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 408
I11. 91, 98, 96 N.E.2d 499, 503 (1951). States protect workers through minimum labor
standards laws. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937).
67. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v. Rath Pack-
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Whenever Congress clearly has legislated on a particular subject,
however, the tenth amendment does not constitute a limitation on
the commerce powers, and conflicting state laws, traditional police
powers or not, must yield.6" The tension between Congress's commerce powers and state police powers that can arise as a result of
voiding conflicting state laws is well illustrated by the ERISA preemption challenges to state laws.6 9
ERISA Preemption
Courts presented with the ERISA preemption issue have struggled to define the appropriate scope of ERISA preemption. Some
courts have struck down state laws providing for comprehensive
health care, 70 minimum coverage in health insurance plans, 7' and
damages for breach of contract 72 and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 73 At the same time, other courts have upheld state
ing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S.
624, 633 (1973); see also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
147 (1963).
68. See Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946); Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313
U.S. 508, 534 (1941); Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 146 (1909); see also Standard
Oil Co. of Calif. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp 695, 710 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (rejecting tenth
amendment challenge to ERISA), affid, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454
U.S. 801 (1981); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (rejecting tenth amendment challenge to ERISA), aftd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
69. See generally Committee on Fiduciary Responsibility, Preemption and ERISA,
13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 977 (1978); see also Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 62;
Kilberg & Heron, supra note 31; Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Law Under
ERISA: Drawing the Line Between Laws That Do and Laws That Do Not Relate to Employee Benefit Plans, 19 FORUM 162 (1983); Turza & Halloway, supra note 62; Note,
ERISA & State Law Preemption, 6 N. KY. L. REv. 379 (1979); Note, ERISA Preemption
of State Law: The Meaning of "Relate To" in Section 514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as The Meaning of "Relate To"].
70. See Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
affd, 623 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), afi'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
71. See Dawson v. Whaland, 529 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.H. 1982); Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aft'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 831 (1978); see also Russo v. Boland, 103 Ill. App. 3d 905, 431 N.E.2d 1294
(1982). But see Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 980 (1978).
72. See Lafferty v. Solar Turbines Int'l, 666 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1982); Murphy v.
Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233 (3rd Cir. 1980); Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs &
Stratton Retirement Plan, 575 F. Supp. 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Whitaker v. Texaco, Inc.,
566 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists Pension
Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
73. Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 105 S.Ct. 81 (1984); Zittrouer v. Uarco Inc. Group Benefit Plan, 582 F. Supp.
1471 (N.D. Ga. 1984). Contra Kelly v. International Business Machines Corp., 573 F.
Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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court marital property settlements 74 and support orders 7 involving
ERISA-covered benefits.
ERISA does not eliminate the states entirely from involvement
with pension and welfare benefit plans. In fact, the Act specifically
preserves a role for state courts in actions by participants or beneficiaries to recover benefits due.7 ' Nevertheless, ERISA does generally preempt "any and all state laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. ' 77 While Congress
thus explicitly expressed its intent to occupy the field of pension
74. See Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); Employee Say. Plan of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Geer, 535 F.
Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Myers, 488 F. Supp. 704
(M.D. La. 1980); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub norm. Seafarers Int'l Union v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981);
In re Marriage of Lionberger, 97 Cal. App. 3d 56, 158 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 951 (1980); In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362
(1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
75. See Operating Engineers Local 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d
196 (9th Cir. 1981); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979);
Senco of Fla., Inc., v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Cody v. Riecker, 454 F.
Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affid, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 626
S.W.2d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Western Elec. Co. v. Traphagen, 166 N.J. Super. 418,
400 A.2d 66 (1979); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 394 A.2d 153 (1978); Cogollos v.
Cogollos, 96 Misc. 2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Faro. Ct. 1978); Commonwealth ex rel.
Magrini v. Magrini, 263 Pa. Super. 366, 398 A.2d 179 (1979).
76. See ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B), (e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B), (e)(1) (1982).
77. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982) (emphasis added). ERISA § 514(a)
provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b)
of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1003(a), (b) provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in sections 1051,
1081, and 1101 of this title, this subchapter shall apply to any employee benefit
plan if it is established or maintained(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or
(2) by any employee organization or organizations representing employees
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or
(3) by both.
(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit
plan if(1) such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in section 1002(32) of this
title);
(2) such plan is a church plan (as defined in section 1002(33) of this title)
with respect to which no election has been made under section 410(d) of Title
26;
(3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applica-
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and welfare benefit plan regulation, 8 the statutory language of the
Act has created some doubt as to the exact boundaries of that
field. 79 As a result, courts have differed in their conclusions as to

which state laws "relate to" employee benefit plans.8 0
In attempting to define the parameters of "relate to" courts have
concentrated on one or more aspects of the state law being challenged. The aspects generally focused on include: (1) the extent to
which the state law conflicts with a specific provision of ERISA or
the overall purpose of the Act ("conflict" analysis);" (2) whether
the state law regulates or is directed at employee benefit plans
("purpose" analysis);82 or (3) whether the effect of the state law is
so tangential or insubstantial as to warrant an implied exception to
preemption ("effect" analysis).8 3
Courts engaging in "conflict" analysis have denied challenges to
ble workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability
insurance laws;
(4) such plan is maintained outside of the United States primarily for the
benefit of persons substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens; or
(5) such plan is an excess benefit plan (as defined in section 1002(36) of this
title) and is unfunded.
78. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981). The scope of
ERISA preemption has been described as "sweeping." See American Progressive Life &
Health Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1983); Old Stone Bank v.
Michaelson, 439 F. Supp. 252, 255 (D.R.I. 1977) (described the scope of ERISA preemption as "virtually total"); Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Bell v. Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 387 (D. Kan.
1977) (ERISA preemption provision characterized as "unique"); see also Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 n.26 (1983); Gast v. State
ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978); Committee on Fiduciary Responsibility, supra note 69, at 978.
79. ERISA itself preserves state laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities.
See ERISA § 514(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982). ERISA also preserves generally applicable state criminal laws. See ERISA § 514(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1982).
However, these exceptions generally have been construed narrowly to give full effect to
Congress's intent of accomplishing comprehensive preemption of state law. See Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2905 (1983); American Progressive Life & Health
Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1983); Woodfork v. Marine
Cooks & Stewards Union, 642 F.2d 966, 970, 972 (5th Cir. 1981); Bell v. Employee Sec.
Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 388 (D. Kan. 1977) (suggesting that the exceptions in the
statute delineate the field preempted by the statute). But see Attorney General v. Travelers Ins. Co., 391 Mass. 730, 463 N.E.2d 548, prob. juris. noted, 105 S. Ct. 320 (1984)
(Shaw Court's characterization of exceptions as "narrow" viewed by majority as dictum);
Goldstein v. Mangano, 99 Misc. 2d 523, 531, 417 N.Y.S.2d 368, 374 (Sup. Ct. 1978)
(exceptions viewed broadly so as to avoid regulatory vacuum).
80. See generally Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69; The Meaning of "Relate To",
supra note 69.
81. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
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state laws which operate in areas left unregulated by Congress. 4
In enacting ERISA, Congress subjected employee welfare benefit
plans which offer benefits other than pensions only to the statute's
reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary requirements.8 " Substantive
provisions of such plans, such as vesting and funding, were "reserved to private choice."'8 6 Some courts, apparently unable to believe that Congress intended to cease all regulation of the
substantive terms of these plans, have upheld state laws at least in
part because of a desire to avoid such a regulatory vacuum. 7
Other courts would strike down only those laws conflicting with
the letter or the spirit of ERISA. s
As noted above, however, when Congress chooses to occupy a
field, it may forbid even parallel or complementary state regulation
which does not in any way conflict with the federal scheme.8 9 This
is true even when Congress chooses to leave all or part of the field
completely unregulated,' as it did when it exempted welfare benefit plans from ERISA's vesting and funding requirements. Moreover, Congress, in enacting ERISA, empowered the federal courts
to develop a body of substantive common law which would fill any
regulatory void created by the preemption of state regulation.9
Accordingly, most courts have spent little time searching for actual
conflicts between state laws and ERISA, and instead have utilized
a purpose or effect analysis of the state law being challenged.92
Some courts suggest that state laws "relate to" employee benefit
84. See infra notes 87, 88.
85. See ERISA §§ 201, 301, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1081 (1982).
86. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1981), af'd sub
nom. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983); see also Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) ("legislative silence may betoken permission").
87. See Gast v. State ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978); see also
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Whaland, 119 N.H. 894, 410
A.2d 635 (1976). See generally Preemption Analysis, supra note 56 (Supreme Court applies strict intent standard to avoid regulatory gap).
88. See Western Elec. Co. v. Traphagen, 166 N.J. Super. 418, 424, 400 A.2d 66, 69
(laws which relate to benefit plans in the manner in which ERISA relates to them); see
also National Bank of North America v. IBEW Local 3, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d
482 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aftid, 69 A.D.2d 679, 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979) (per curiam); Gast v.
State ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978).
89. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
90. Id.
91. See Helms v. Monsanto Co., 728 F.2d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1984); see also 120
CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 4771
(remarks of Sen. Javits) ("It is also intended that a body of Federal Substantive law will
be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under
private welfare and pension plans.").
92. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text; infra notes 93-105.
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plans only insofar as they seek to "regulate" 93 or are "directed at
any particular plan or at employee benefit plans in general." 94 It
has been suggested that ERISA section 514(c)(2) supports this position because it defines "State" as "a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which
purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions
of employee benefit plans." 95 Thus, one appellate judge wrote that
from preemption state laws which have a
this definition would save
96
"nonregulatory effect,"

and commentators have suggested that it

also would preserve laws which regulate something other than
terms and conditions of plans.97 Moreover, two commentators
have concluded that by using the phrase "purports to regulate,"
Congress may have chosen to limit preemption to laws by which
the state intended to regulate benefit plans. 9
By referring to indirect as well as direct regulation, however,
Congress has caused some courts to focus not on the state's purpose but rather on the effect of state regulation. Strict preemptionists have argued that ERISA supersedes state laws even when the
effect of those laws on employee benefit plans is "indirect." 99 In
contrast, other courts have ignored ERISA's prohibition of indirect state regulation and have upheld state statutes and state causes
of action which clearly would have some indirect effect on the op93. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afi'd,
571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); In re Marriage of Johnston, 85
Cal. App. 3d 900, 909-10, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798, 804 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980); Smith v. Crowder Jr. Co., 280 Pa. Super. 220, 421 A.2d 1107, 1113 (1980).
94. American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 715 F.2d 784, 787 (2d
Cir. 1983).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
96. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 679 F.2d 1307, 1312
(9th Cir. 1982) (Tang, J., dissenting), vacated, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983).
97. See Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69, at 172; Reppy, Community and Separate
Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 417, 515 (1978).
98. Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69, at 172.
99. Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Danzinger, 709 F.2d 815, 831 (3rd Cir. 1983),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 104 S.Ct.
3179 (1984); see also Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 77 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Peacock's Apothecary,
Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1258, 1273 (N.D. Ala. 1983).
For example, in Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981), the Eighth Circuit held that ERISA preempted a state
common law claim of tortious interference with contract even though the common law
did not purport to regulate and was not directed at employee benefit plans per se. The
court found sufficient the fact that the contract with which the defendants allegedly interfered was an employee benefit plan. Id. at 1211.
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eration of benefit plans.1co Some courts have found the effects of
' ' or "tangential"'10 2 to justify prestate laws too "insubstantial" 10
emption. These courts, however, generally have required not only
that the state laws affect plans indirectly but also that the state
laws involve areas of important state concern, 0 3 thus invoking the
strong presumption against preemption of traditional police powers.1° 4 Alternatively, a court may find a state law "tangential" if it
relates primarily to matters not regulated by ERISA.1 °5 In attempting to determine which state laws "relate to" ERISA benefit
plans, the United States Supreme Court has also concentrated on
the effect the challenged state laws have on such plans, rather than
on the purpose of the state laws or on the extent to which they
conflict with specific provisions of ERISA.
The United States Supreme Court Treatment of
ERISA Preemption
In recent years, the Supreme Court has twice decided cases involving the scope of ERISA's preemption clause. The first case to
address the preemption issue was Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc. 106 Alessi involved an ERISA challenge to a New Jersey statute
which prohibited pension plans from offsetting workers' compensation awards against pension payments.'0 7 Writing for a unanimous
100. See infra notes 101-05. For example, one court found that ERISA preempted a
state consumer protection law and an unfair business practices statute, insofar as these
laws might alter ERISA's "controls" on a benefit plan, but that ERISA did not supersede
state claims against the plan which alleged fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and bad faith. The latter claims were not preempted because they had only an "indirect effect" on the plan. See Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388,
391 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
101. Kelly v. International Business Machines, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 366, 371 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
102. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Seafarers Int'l Union v. Stone, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
103. See, e.g., Deiches v. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, 572 F. Supp. 766, 771
(D.N.J. 1983) (state preference law); Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F.
Supp. 388, 391 (E.D. Cal. 1981) (protection against fraud and intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
104. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Lukus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 276 Pa. Super. 232, 419 A.2d 431
(1980).
106. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
107. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 521. Two district court judges upheld the statute, finding that
it was "solely concerned with protecting the employee's right to worker's compensation
disability benefits." Id. at 524 (quoting Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp.
867, 873 (D.N.J. 1978)). The two judges also found that the statute had "only . . . a
collateral effect on pension plans." Id. (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., No.
78-0434 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 1979)). The Second Circuit reversed both decisions. Buczynski
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Court,"°' Justice Marshall noted that the effect of ERISA's "relates
to" preemption language is unclear when the state law being challenged apparently regulates matters other than pension plans.1° 9
The Court focused not on the purpose of the state law but on its
effect, and held that the workers' compensation statute "related to"
employee benefit plans because it eliminated a method of calculating benefits permitted by ERISA.110 The Court did not give any
weight to the fact that the state's intrusion into the benefit plan
field was indirect rather than direct."'
The Court specifically reserved judgment, however, on the nature or extent of the effect necessary to trigger preemption.1 1 2 It
noted that it was expressing no view on the merits of two decisions
which had upheld state domestic relations and sex discrimination
laws that had a peripheral effect on benefit plans. 1 3 Although the
Court employed an effect-type analysis, it seemed to breathe fresh
life into the conflict-based line of analysis" 4 by concentrating on
the state law's elimination of an ERISA-allowed method of calculation. Subsequent cases and commentary have interpreted Alessi
to mean that a direct clash between federal and state requirements
or objectives might be a prerequisite to a finding of preemption.115
The Supreme Court had another opportunity to define the scope
of ERISA preemption in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.1 1 6 Shaw
involved a challenge to New York's Human Rights Law,' which
v. General Motors Corp., 616 F.2d 1238 (2d Cir. 1980), affid sub nom. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
108. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision.
109. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 523-24.
110. Id. at 524-25.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 525 n.21. See Deiches v. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, 572 F.
Supp. 766, 769 (D.N.J. 1983).
113. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 525 n.21 (citing American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d
118 (2d Cir. 1979) and Gast v. State ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12
(1978)).
114. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (analysis based on the extent to
which state law conflicts with the letter or spirit of ERISA).
115. See, e.g., Local Union 212 IBEW Vacation Trust Fund v. Local 212 IBEW
Credit Union, 549 F. Supp. 1299, 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (there must be some express or
implied provision of ERISA which addresses the matter); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 520 F. Supp. 539, 549 (D. Md. 1981) (noting
Alessi's reference to New Jersey's elimination of a calculation method permitted by
ERISA); see also Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69, at 166.
116. 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983).
117. The case also involved a challenge to New York's Disability Law. Id. at 290506. The Court's discussion of this issue, however, focused on ERISA § 4(b)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b)(3) (1982), which exempts from ERISA coverage plans maintained solely for
the purpose of complying with state disability laws.
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prohibited discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in employee
benefit plans. Prior to Shaw, this type of challenge generally failed
because courts held that fair employment and sex discrimination
laws either were saved by ERISA section 514(d) 18 or survived preemption because they failed to conflict with any of ERISA's provisions.119 In contrast, the Shaw Court struck down the New York
law and held that the breadth of the ERISA preemption provisions
was apparent from the language of the statute itself.120 Relying on
Black's Law Dictionary as his guide, Justice Blackmun wrote for a
unanimous court that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan,
in the normal sense of the1 phrase, if it has a connection with or
12
reference to such plan."'
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982), provides that: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the United
States .... ." Section 708 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7
(1982), preserves non-conflicting state discrimination laws. Hence, courts have held,
since ERISA preserves federal laws like Title VII, and since Title VII preserves state
discrimination laws, ERISA preserves state discrimination laws. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie
Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 599 F.2d 205, 210-11
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 520 F. Supp. 539, 549 (D. Md. 1981); Thompson v.
Board of Educ. of Romeo Community Schools, 519 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (W.D. Mich.
1981); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 396, 401 (Minn. 1979),
appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
119. The leading case is Gast v. State ex rel. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12
(1978), in which the Oregon court of appeals adopted a conflict-based analysis. This type
of analysis has become the minority view. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 62, at 57.
The Gast court found nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended
to leave welfare benefit plans unregulated and held that the word "supersede" in ERISA
§ 514(a) "connote[d] supplanting one thing with another. . . .Here Congress has only in
small part supplanted state regulation. . . . We will not presume Congressional intent to
preempt unless Congress 'has unmistakably so ordained.' Here it has not." 585 P.2d at
23 (citation omitted).
See also General Motors Corp. v. UAW, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769, 1772
(E.D. Mich. 1980) ("How can these [fair employment statutes] be considered state laws
relating to any employee benefit plan?"); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 68 I11.
App. 3d 829, 835, 386 N.E.2d 599, 604 (1979) ("ERISA makes no
attempt to deal with fair employment practices and cannot then be considered as having
preempted the field."), rev'd on other grounds, 81 Ill.2d 136, 407 N.E.2d 539 (1980). The
Supreme Court had sent out mixed signals in cases involving fair employment and sex
discrimination statutes, dismissing appeals of two decisions upholding state laws and denying certiorari in a case which reached the opposite result. Compare Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 396 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1041
(1980); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Indus. of Montana, 608 P.2d 1047 (Mont. 1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980) with Pervel
Indus., Inc. v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 468 F.Supp. 490
(D. Conn. 1978), affd mem., 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031
(1980).
120. Shaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2900.
121. Id.
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The Court quoted extensively from ERISA's legislative history,
which revealed that Congress had rejected narrower preemption
provisions in earlier versions of the bill122 and in a version proposed by the Administration,1 2 all of which would have limited
preemption to state laws conflicting directly with ERISA provisions. The Court also cited the sponsors' concern with "conflicting" or "inconsistent" state laws, 12 phrases which the Court
122. Id. at 2900-01 n.18. The Court stated that:
The bill that passed the House, H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Sec. 514(a) (1974),
[3 Legislative History, supra note 2, at 4057-58], provided that ERISA
would supersede state laws "relatfing] to the reportingand disclosure responsibilities and fiduciary responsibilities," of persons acting on behalf of any employee
benefit plan to which part 1 applies." The bill that passed the Senate, H.R. 2,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 699(a) (1974), [3 Legislative History, supra note 2, at
3820], provided for pre-emption of state laws "relatfing] to the subject matters
required by this Act or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act."
(emphasis added).
123. Shaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2900-01. The Administration "suggested language making
explicit the areas of state law to be preempted." Id. at 2901 n. 19 (citing 3 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 5145-46).
124. 103 S.Ct. at 2901. Representative Dent remarked:
Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of
this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate
the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round
out the protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting
and inconsistent State and local regulation.
120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
4670.
Senator Williams stated:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the
substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulation of employee benefit plans.
This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or
local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law.
120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
4745-46.
Senator Javits said:
Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law, but-with
one major exception appearing in the House bill--defined the perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such a formulation raised
the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action that might
impinge on Federal regulation, as well as opening the door to multiple and
potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with some particular
aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not clearly connected to the
Federal regulatory scheme.
Although the desirability of further regulation-at either the State or Federal
level-undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emergence of a
comprehensive and pervasive Federal interest and the interest of uniformity
with respect to interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the displacement of State action in the field of private employee benefit programs. ...
In view of Federal preemption, State laws compelling disclosure from private
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concluded referred to conflicts among the states rather than conflicts between state laws and ERISA.1 25 Because the Court believed that Congress was concerned with the states' passing laws
that would be inconsistent with each other, it made sense for the
Court to interpret the preemption provision expansively as addressing that concern. Citing no authority, the Court went on to
discuss the burdens placed on interstate employers forced to com12 6
ply with "varied and perhaps conflicting" state regulations.
Such burdens, the Court believed, would result in "inefficiency" in
the administration of a nationwide plan' 127
which "presumably would
levels."
benefit
lowering
by
for
be paid
While Shaw has been described as "clos[ing] a chapter of analysis, "128 it left a few more chapters to be written. The Court's opinion took the phrase "relate to," which had confused the lower
courts, and defined it with the two equally vague phrases of "connection with" or "reference to." '29 The Court also noted that some
state regulation might have too tenuous or peripheral an effect to
support a0 finding that the state law "related to" the employee bene3

fit plan.1

Despite the broad sweep of Shaw, some state laws which seemingly have a connection with or reference to ERISA benefit plans
have escaped preemption. For example, the Seventh Circuit allowed a state to order payment of pension benefits to a participant's former spouse, 3 '1 and a district court found that a
welfare or pension plans, imposing fiduciary requirements on such plans, imposing criminal penalties on failure to contribute to plans-unless a criminal statute of general application ---establishing State termination insurance programs,
et cetera, will be superseded. It is also intended that a body of Federal Substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and
obligations under private welfare and pension plans. At the same time, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to enter into agreements with officials of state
agencies to assist him in the performance of his functions under the conference
substitute, which could include arrangements, for example, for auditing specific
plans or assisting in the collection and monitoring of required plan data.
120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
4770-71.
125. Shaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2904; cf Attorney General v. Travelers Ins. Co., 391 Mass.
730, _, 463 N.E.2d 548, 551 (1984), prob. juris. noted, 105 S.Ct. 320 (1984) ("This
phrase is as susceptible of our interpretation-i.e., conflicting and inconsistent with Federal law . . .- as of the Supreme Court's interpretation.").
126. Shaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2904 n.25.
127. Id.
128. Kilberg & Inman, supra note 69, at 168.
129. Shaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2900.
130. 1d. at 2901 n.21.
131. See Savings & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038
(7th Cir. 1983).
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mistreated plan participant's claim of emotional distress survived
Shaw,132 because the claims in each case had too tenuous an impact
on ERISA plans to warrant preemption. In addition, a Minnesota
state agency argued that Shaw implied that ERISA does not occupy the field but only preempts conflicting state laws. 133 Most

courts, however, have read Shaw more broadly in striking down a
variety of state laws regulating subjects on which ERISA is silent. 134 In fact, the federal district court adopted this broad35 reading of Shaw in California Hospital Association v. Henning.1
DISCUSSION

California Hospital Association v. Henning
Facts
The statute at issue in Henning was California Labor Code section 227.3.136 This provision required employers to pay employees
who had left their jobs the monetary equivalent of vacation pay
vested at the time of cessation of employment. The statute, which
was enforced by the state labor commissioner,1 37 provided for pay132. See Kelly v. International Business Machines Corp., 573 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa.
1983). But see Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984); Zittrouer v. Uarco Inc. Group Benefit Plan, 582
F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
133. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Gomez-Bethke, 34 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
837, 842 (D. Minn. 1984). The state agency apparently relied on the Shaw Court's summary of its holding that "New York's Human Rights Law is pre-empted with respect to
ERISA benefit plans only insofar as it prohibits practices that are lawful under federal
law." Shaw, 103 S. Ct. at 2906 (emphasis added). The Northwest Airlines court rejected
the agency's interpretation and noted that "[t]he limitation expressed in the Shaw holding
was required because of the unique relationship between Title VII and state fair employment laws." Northwest Airlines, 34 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 843 (D. Minn. 1984);
see also supra note 118.
134. See, e.g., Champion Int'l Corp. v. Brown, 731 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1984) (age
discrimination); Russell v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.
1983) cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984) (infliction of emotional distress); Tolson v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 566 F. Supp. 1503 (E.D. Wis.
1984) (breach of contract); Davis v. Line Constr. Benefit Fund, No. 82-1032 (W.D. Mo.
Apr. 17, 1984) (available Oct. 1, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file) (subrogation); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, No. 83-8707 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1984) (available Oct. 1, 1984,
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file) (hospital reimbursement rates).
135. 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-6381 and No. 836416 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 1983).
136. CAL. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (West Supp. 1984); see supra note 7 for the full text of
this provision.
137. CAL. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (West Supp. 1984). The labor commissioner had the
authority to take assignments of wage claims, including claims for vacation pay, id
§ 96(h)(West Supp. 1984), to conduct hearings, id. § 98.1 (West Supp. 1984) and make
binding determinations, id., subject to de novo appeal in state trial courts, id. § 98.2
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ment in accordance with the employee's contract of employment
or the employer's policy "respecting eligibility or time served."' 38
However, payment had to be made at the employee's final rate of
pay and the contract or policy could not provide39for forfeiture of
vested vacation time at the time of termination.
No California employer alleged any conflict between ERISA and
section 227.3 until the California Supreme Court decided Suastez v.
Plastic Dress-Up Co. 140 In that case, employee Suastez was terminated three months before his anniversary date, on which he would
have earned a full two weeks of vacation.1 4' When his employer
denied his request for prorated vacation pay, Suastez filed a claim
with the labor commissioner which was denied. 4 2 The California
Supreme Court, however, held unanimously that as services are
pay vests, a right which
rendered, a proportionate right to vacation
43
forfeiture.'
from
protects
section 227.3
A few months after the California Supreme Court denied rehearing of Suastez on the issue of ERISA preemption, six trade associations, representing thousands of California employers, filed suit to
enjoin the labor commissioner from enforcing section 227.3, Suastez, and the labor commissioner's policy memorandum implementing the Suastez holding.1" The complaint was filed pursuant to
(West Supp. 1984). The Labor Code provided for both civil and criminal penalties, id.
§§ 203, 216 (West 1971 and Supp. 1984), in the event an employer willfully refused to
pay wages, including vacation pay.
138. CAL LAB. CODE § 227.3 (West Supp. 1984).
139.

Id.

140. 31 Cal.3d 774, 647 P.2d 122, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982).
141. Id. at 777, 647 P.2d at 123, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
142. The Suastez opinion does not disclose why the labor commissioner denied the
claim. Prior to enactment of section 227.3's antiforfeiture provision, several California
courts had held that proration of vacation pay was not required in situations like that in
Suastez. See, e.g., Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.,
138 Cal. App. 2d 92, 291 P.2d 169 (1955); Division of Lab. Law Enforcement v. Standard
Coil Prod. Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 919, 288 P.2d 637 (1955); Division of Labor Law
Enforcement v. Mayfair Mkts., 102 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 943, 227 P.2d 463 (1951).
143. Suastez, 31 Cal. 3d at 784, 647 P.2d 128, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
144. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction at 22, California Hosp.
Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Under ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1982), the term "State law" includes "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law."
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement Policy and Procedure Memorandum 82-4, July 25, 1982, interpreted Suastez as follows:
This decision means that an employee who is terminated or who terminates
before an eligibility date for vacation pay, is entitled to pro rata vacation pay for
time served up to the date of termination in that that portion of vacation pay
has vested upon termination; and moreover, that such pro rata vacation pay
cannot be taken away from the employee, for to do so the employer would be

19851

ERISA Preemption

ERISA section 502(a)(3), which allows fiduciaries to bring a civil
action to enjoin any act or practice which violates ERISA. 45
The associations alleged that they and their members' vacation
plans were "employee benefit plans"14 6 and that California's vacation pay laws "related to" those plans and thus were preempted by
ERISA. 4 7 The employers, represented by the associations, administered three types of vacation plans: those that paid benefits from
a trust, those adopted as part of a collective bargaining agreement,
48
and those that the employer funded out of its general assets.
The labor commissioner conceded that ERISA regulated vacation
trusts, 14 9 and that section 227.3's regulatory provisions did not apply to collective bargaining agreements. 5 ° The ERISA preemption argument 51 thus centered on the last type of arrangement, one
in which the monies for vacation pay come from the general assets
of the employer, rather than from a trust fund.
The Henning Opinion and Judgment
The first issue the Henning court had to address was whether
vacation payments from an employer's general assets were "employee welfare benefit plans" covered by ERISA and thereby
shielded from state regulation. ERISA section 3(1) included in its
definition of such plans "any plan, fund or program . . .established or maintained for the purpose of providing . . . vacation
benefits." 152 The labor commissioner argued that this definition included only those welfare plans which complied with ERISA secinvoking a forfeiture against the employee, in violation of Labor Code Section
227.3.
This decision means: (1) vacation accrues and vests from the moment an employee commences employment; and upon termination of employment, short of
reaching any so-called eligibility date for entitlement to a full vacation, the employee is entitled to a pro rata share of vacation pay as accrued and vested for
time served.
145. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1982).
146. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction at 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 19,
California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
147. Id. at 19.
148. Id. at 4, 6, 8, 10, 13, 15.
149. Henning, 569 F. Supp. at 1545.
150. Section 227.3 begins, "Unless otherwise provided by a collective-bargaining
agreement..." CAL. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (West Supp. 1984).
151. When the court issued its preliminary injunction, it included NLRA preemption
as one of the bases for granting relief. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, No. 82-6659
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1983) (order granting preliminary injunction at 3). The court did not
reach the NLRA issue in its published opinion. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569
F. Supp. 1544, 1547 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
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tion 403's 53 requirement that welfare benefit plan assets be
maintained in a trust.1 54 The commissioner further relied upon the
Department of Labor regulation which excluded from the definition of employee welfare benefit plan payments of vacation pay
from the employer's general assets.155 Such payments, the commis56
sioner contended, were not plans or programs under ERISA.
The court rejected both of the commissioner's arguments. It
agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that while placing assets in a
trust sometimes would be necessary to comply with ERISA, the
15
trust requirement was not a prerequisite to ERISA coverage.
Citing Donovan v. Dillingham,5 ' it held that a plan or program
need include only intended benefits, intended beneficiaries, a source
of financing and a procedure for application and collection of benefits. ' 59 The court found that the Department of Labor regulation
applied only to discretionary vacation practices and not to vacation
pay plans or programs to which employers were committed, by
contract or otherwise.' 6° Moreover, to the extent that the regulation would have exempted every nontrusteed vacation program,
the court found that it conflicted with the language of ERISA itself
and constituted
an "invalid arrogation of power by the
61
Department."'

The court next considered whether the vacation pay laws "related to" the employers' benefit plans. Finding that Shaw had put
to rest any doubt as to the ambit of ERISA's preemption section,
the court held that the state laws were preempted because they
62
directly regulated participation, vesting, and benefit calculations. 1
The published order was limited to section 227.3, Suastez, and the
enforcement memorandum. When judgment issued a few weeks
later, however, the permanent injunction not only struck down the
regulatory provisions of the vacation pay laws but also ordered the
labor commissioner not to accept, investigate, or take assignment
of vacation pay claims, and not to require employer responses, con153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).
ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b) (1984); see supra note 39 for the text of this provision.
Henning, 569 F. Supp. at 1545.
Id. at 1546.
688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982).
Henning, 569 F. Supp. at 1546.
Id.

IM
Id. at 1547.

1985]

ERISA Preemption

duct hearings, or issue orders relating to vacation pay claims. 63
As a consequence, California could not provide an administrative
forum even for ERISA-based vacation pay claims. The published
order and the judgment were silent as to why it was necessary to
eliminate the administrative handling of all vacation pay claims in
order to prevent enforcement of section 227.3, Suastez, and the enforcement memorandum.164
163. Judgment at 3-4, California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, No. 82-6659 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 12, 1983). The full text of the summary judgment follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. That plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is,
granted.
2. That any vacation program (i) maintained by an employer engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce for the purpose of providing vacation benefits
to employees, other than an employee benefit plan specified in Section 4(b) of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1003 (b), and (ii) which is a "plan, fund or program" is
declared an employee welfare benefit plan subject to ERISA coverage, irrespective of whether such arrangement is funded, trusteed, or embodied in a writing.
3. That the decision of the California Supreme Court in Suastez v. Plastic
Dress-Up Company, 31 Cal. 3d 774, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846, 647 P.2d 122 (1982)
("Suastez"), California Labor Code Sec. 227.3, and Policy and Procedure
Memo 82-4 of the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, as
modified, are declared preempted and superseded by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Sec.
1144, and therefore inoperative and invalid insofar as they relate to vacation
programs which are in fact employee welfare benefit plans within the meaning
of ERISA as described in sub-paragraph 2 above.
4. That defendant, his agents, his staff, and employees of the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, as well as all those in active concert or
participation with the aforementioned individuals, are hereby permanently enjoined from administering, implementing, or enforcing, in any manner whatsoever, Policy and Procedure Memo 82-4, or any other enforcement policy, in any
manner that relates to vacation plans, funds or programs which are in fact employee welfare benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA as described in subparagraph 2 above. Those activities specifically enjoined regarding such plans,
funds or programs shall include:
(a) Accepting or investigating claims or accepting assignments of claims of
employees or former employees for vacation benefits;
(b) Requiring employer responses to claims of employees for vacation benefits;
(c) Conducting hearings on claims of employees or former employees for vacation benefits;
(d) Issuing, filing, or prosecuting any order, decision or award pursuant to
California Labor Code Secs. 98a, 98.1, 98.3, 98.4 or any other state law relating
to claims of employees and former employees for vacation benefits; and
(e) Attempting in any way, through threat of civil sanctions, criminal prosecution, or otherwise, to persuade, coerce, or compel employers to comply with
Policy and Procedure Memo 82-4.
5. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and that plaintiffs recover
from defendant taxable costs and disbursements of this action pursuant to 29
U.S.C. Sec. 1132(g)(1) and/or Fed.R. Civ. Pro. 54(d) and Local Rule 15.
164. There was a middle ground that the court rejected. The court essentially
adopted as its own the draft judgment submitted by the employer associations. Compare
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ANALYSIS

The Henning court struck down California's regulation of the
terms of vacation plans and eliminated the state labor commissioner's authority to provide both an administrative forum for vacation pay claims and enforcement of claims found to be valid.
While ERISA itself provides some support for the court's finding
that benefit payments from general assets can be covered by the
Act,

65

well-settled principles of statutory construction i 66 and the

Act's legislative history161 undermine the court's determination
that vacation payments from general assets are "welfare benefit
plans" under ERISA. The Henning court should have deferred to
the Department of Labor regulation which excluded such payments from ERISA coverage. 6 If such arrangements are "welfare
benefit plans," California's substantive vacation pay laws "related
to" the plans within the meaning of ERISA's preemption clause as
interpreted by Shaw.169 It appears, however, that Congress never
intended, and Shaw does not support, the conclusion that state administrative enforcement procedures "relate to" such plans. 70 Indeed, there is no evidence that Congress intended to foreclose state
administrative agencies from hearing vacation pay claims when it
gave state courts concurrent jurisdiction over such claims.
Plaintiffs' Form of Judgment, California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544
(C.D. Cal. 1983) with the court's Judgment, supra note 163. The labor commissioner had
objected to the breadth of the language submitted by the associations, Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Amended at 2,
California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983), and had suggested the following:
That defendant, his agents, his staff, and employees of the California Division of
Labor Standards Enforcement, as well as all those in active concert or participation with the aforementioned individuals, are hereby permanently enjoined
from administering, implementing, or enforcing, in any manner whatever, Policy and Procedure Memo 82-4, insofar as the same relates to vacation plans,
funds or programs which are in fact employee welfare benefit plans within the
meaning of ERISA, as against Plaintiffs and their members ...
That nothing in this judgment shall be construed as to prevent Defendant
from taking assignments from claimant/employees under ERISA and proceeding under ERISA.
Defendant's Form of Judgment, California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning 569 F. Supp. 1544
(C.D. Cal. 1983).
165. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 202-19 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 225-46 and accompanying text.
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"Plan" or "Program"
The Henning court rejected the California labor commissioner's
argument that ERISA covers only benefit plans funded by a
trust. 7 ' As noted above, ERISA preempts only those state laws
which relate to pension and welfare benefit plans. 72 If such plans
include only plans whose assets are held in trust, vacation payments from general assets are not employee welfare benefit plans
and thus laws that relate to such arrangements are not preempted.
On the other hand, if ERISA does cover nontrusteed plans, a literal reading of the statute could mandate inclusion of all plans,
benefits and
funds, or programs maintained to provide vacation
73
preemption of state laws relating to such plans.
It is true, as the labor commissioner argued in Henning, that
ERISA section 403'14 requires that all assets of employee benefit
plans be held in trust. Welfare benefit plans, however, are exempt
from ERISA's funding requirements and thus need not have specific assets set aside for payment of benefits. 175 Furthermore, certain provisions of ERISA support an inference that Congress
intended coverage of some plans funded from general assets. In
defining welfare benefit plan, Congress referred to "any" plan or
program providing covered benefits, 76 not just to plans or programs the assets of which are placed in trust. Moreover, ERISA
exempts from its bonding requirements plans which provide for
payment from the general assets of the employer, 7 7 and the Department of Labor included such plans in its regulation exempting
small welfare plans from ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements. 17 If ERISA covered only plans funded by a trust,
there would be no need to exempt from these requirements plans
funded from general assets since such plans would be entirely
outside the statute. Thus, Henning's conclusion that ERISA coverage is not limited to trusteed plans is correct.
To say that plans or programs not established in trust form can
171. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983), appeal
docketed, No. 83-6381 and No. 83-6416 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 1983).
172. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 22.
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982) provides in relevant part: "[A]II assets of an employee
benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trustees."
175. ERISA § 301(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(1) (1982), specifically exempts welfare
benefit funds from the requirements of ERISA Part 3, §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 10811086 (1982), which imposes minimum funding standards.
176. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982); see supra note 22.
177. ERISA § 412(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(1) (1982).
178. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-20(b)(2)(1) (1984).
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be "welfare benefit plans," however, is not to say that all such
plans or programs fall within the statutory definition. It is true
that on its face the statute covers "any plan, fund or program"
which provides "vacation benefits."'' 79 Courts must give effect to a
statute's plain language unless there is evidence that Congress intended some more restrictive meaning.1 8° Here, however, the
words "plan" or "program" are not defined in the statute.' 8' Further, even when statutory language appears clear on superficial examination, no rule of law forbids the use of aids to statutory
construction. s2 It is, therefore, appropriate to examine the context
in which the words appear and the legislative history 83 to determine Congress's actual intent.
Compliance with a statute's requirements is not a prerequisite to
coverage.' 84 The overall scheme of regulation, however, provides
the context in which particular provisions must be examined. 8 5
Under ERISA, Congress intended that welfare benefit plans
would, for example, file annual reports8 6 containing statements of
assets and liabilities, 8 ' be established and maintained pursuant to a
179. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982); see supra note 22.
180. Shaw, 103 S. Ct. at 2900; see also Insurance Comm'r v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 296 Md. 334, 339, 463 A.2d 793, 795 (1983).
181. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
182. Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976).
183. See infra notes 184-92 and 196-99.
184. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544, 1546 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
In National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. I11.
1985), appeal docketed,
No. 85-1263 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 1985), the court disagreed with this view and held that a
vacation pay plan which paid benefits from an employer's general assets was not an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA because the plan failed to comply with the
statute's requirements for such plans. The court stated:
[T]he court is pointed to no established fund, no beneficiaries and no fiduciaries.
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence of a summary plan description, no annual
reports, no trust agreement, which would lead the court to conclude that this
was an ERISA fund established or maintained by the employer for the benefit of
its employees....
According to plaintiff, however, the "plain meaning" of the statute mandates a finding that its plan is within ERISA. While it is true that ERISA encompasses "vacation benefits" under the rubric of employee welfare plan, 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1), it is equally true that such benefits must meet the other
ERISA requirements that the assets of the plan be funded in trust.
Id. at 236.
185. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 109
(1975); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations,
520 F. Supp. 539, 549 (D. Md. 1981) ("[C]ongressional intent must be discerned by considering the entire enactment against the backdrop of its policies and objectives.").
186. ERISA § 101(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(b)(4) (1982).
187. ERISA § 103(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(1) (1982).
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written instrument naming one or more fiduciaries,
carry out a funding policy,

189

hold assets in

88 establish

trust,1 90

and

and sue or be

sued as an entity.' 91 This scheme simply does not correspond to
vacation payments from employers' general assets today or at the
time of ERISA's passage. While noncompliance does not equal
noncoverage, universal noncompliance over an entire decade and
with the seeming approval of Congress provides a useful "social
context"' 92 in which to interpret the definition of welfare benefit
plan.
The Henning court also failed to view the statute "in light of the
abuses it was designed to correct" and in light of the underlying
intent of Congress. 193 ERISA was designed to assure the equitable
194
character and financial soundness of employee benefit plans.
Congress did not try to regulate every form of compensation promised to employees by their employers. It attempted to cover only
those types of plans which had suffered from the abuses it wished
to remedy. 95 In the thousands of pages which make up the legislative history of ERISA, 96 there is not the slightest indication that
Congress perceived any abuse or sought to regulate in the area of
vacation payments from employers' general assets.
Congress did intend to regulate vacation trusts. Such arrangements, commonly found in the construction industry, were subject
to the requirements of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act ("WPPDA"), 197 which ERISA replaced. Earlier versions of
188. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l) (1982).
189. ERISA § 402(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (1982).
190. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
191. ERISA § 502(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1) (1982.
192. See Dickerson, supra note 185, at 109 ("The principle that permits a court to
take into account what is judicially noticeable relates to the examination of segments in
the total relevant social context.").
193. In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 121, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362, 366
(1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) ("Act must be viewed in light of the
abuses it was designed to correct."); McDougall v. Donovan, 552 F. Supp. 1206, 1214
(N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Each provision of ERISA must be interpreted in light of the Congressional intent underlying the Act.").
194. See supra note 21.
195. Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 1980); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 38.
196. The three-volume legislative history of ERISA compiled by the Subcommittee
on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare contains more than five
thousand pages. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2.
197. In Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S.
Ct. 2841 (1983), the Supreme Court described a typical vacation trust as follows:
As part of the hourly compensation due bargaining unit members, employers
pay a certain amount to [the vacation trust], which places the money in an
account for each employee. Once a year, [the trust] distributes the money in
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ERISA, which did not seek to incorporate provisions of the
WPPDA, did not include any reference to vacation benefits.19 It
was only when Congress decided to include all benefit plan regulations in one statute that the "vacation benefit" language appeared.199 There is no evidence that the WPPDA ever was
construed to apply to nontrusteed vacation arrangements. Hence,
it appears that Congress intended only to include vacation trusts
when it appended the revised WPPDA with its reference to vacation benefits to its pension reform legislation.
The Department of Labor Regulation
The Henning court also declined to defer to an administrative
regulation which supported the labor commissioner's position. In
determining whether vacation payments from general assets constituted "plans" or "programs," the court instead relied upon the
Eleventh Circuit's definition of those terms in Donovan v. Dillingham.2 °° Such vacation pay arrangements fit nicely within the Dillingham definition: they include intended benefits (vacation pay),
intended beneficiaries (normally all employees, or at least all fulltime employees), a source of financing (general assets) and a procedure for application and collection of benefits (the employer's regular personnel and payroll procedures). The Dillingham court cited
no authority for its definition but appears merely to have restated
ERISA's definition of employee welfare benefit plan. 20 1 To the ex-

tent that Dillingham correctly interpreted that definition, the Henning court properly found that vacation payments from general
assets constitute plans or programs and thus are ERISA welfare
benefit plans.
On the other hand, the Henning court had before it a Department of Labor regulation that attempted to define the boundaries
of ERISA's coverage. This regulation excluded from the definition
each account to the employee for whom it is kept, provided the employee complies with [the trust's] application procedures.
Id. at 2844 n.2; see also Electrical Workers Local 1 Credit Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Mo. 1979). The Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act was formerly codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309.
198. See, e.g., S. 1179, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 501(g)(l) (1973), reprintedin 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 780, 958.
199. The bills which the Senate and House sent to the conference committee each
consolidated pension benefit plan and welfare benefit plan regulation. See the texts of
H.R.2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at
3599-895 (Senate version), 3898-4250 (House version).
200. 688 F.2d 1367, 1372; see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
201. 688 F.2d 1367, 1372.
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of welfare benefit plan nontrusteed vacation payroll practices.2 °2
Congress granted the Secretary of Labor authority to promulgate
regulations necessary to carry out ERISA's provisions and to define technical and trade terms used in the Act.2 °3 To the extent
that Congress was delegating the power to make law by filling gaps
in the statutory language, the Department's regulation was entitled
to controlling weight unless
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
' '2 4
contrary to the statute.

0

When Congress grants authority to make rules necessary for the
efficient enforcement of a statute, such rules are binding and
should be sustained unless they tend to defeat the purpose of the
statutory scheme. 20 5 ERISA was designed to protect the interests
of workers and their beneficiaries in earned pension and welfare
benefit plans. 206 It is difficult to see how a regulation excluding vacation payroll practices from ERISA coverage would interfere
with this purpose since no provision in the Act regulates such practices. Indeed, the only protection of vacation benefits afforded California workers was the statute the Henning court struck down.
The court apparently believed that the Secretary was attempting
to rewrite the statute rather than merely fill a gap. 207 ERISA, however, nowhere defines the terms "plan" or "program" which appear in the definition of welfare benefit plan.20 While "plan" and
"program" may not be technical or trade terms in everyday conversation, they became technical or trade terms when used by Congress to define the scope of ERISA coverage. When the Secretary
followed the congressional mandate to define such terms, his rule
arguably had the force of law and the court should have deferred
9
20
to it.

Even if the Department's regulation merely interpreted the
words "plan, fund or program," the court should have deferred to
the Department's interpretation. The regulation had particular
202. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b) (1984); see supra note 39 for the text of this provision.
203. ERISA § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1982); see supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
204. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S.Ct.
2778, 2782 (1984); see supra notes 43, 46, 47 and accompanying text.
205. National Ass'n Pharmaceutical Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 889 (2d Cir. 1981);
Baker v. Otis Elevator Co., 609 F.2d 686, 692 (3rd Cir. 1979).
206. See supra notes 1-5, 20-28 and accompanying text.
207. Henning, 569 F. Supp. at 1546 ("If that regulation does indeed intend ERISA
exemption of every unfunded vacation program, it is at clear odds with language of the
statute itself and an invalid arrogation of power by the Department.").
208. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982).
209. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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force because when it was enacted in 1975, it was "a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to
be aware of congressional intent. '210° The court should have also
considered that the regulation had been in force for eight years and
had survived two sets of amendments 211 to the section to which the
regulation referred.21 2 Congress's failure to alter the administrative construction adds to the presumption in favor of the Department's interpretation, which the Henning court was bound to
follow in the absence of compelling indications that the interpretation was wrong. 213
An interpretive regulation is entitled to less deference when it
can be judged against a corresponding statutory definition. 214
Although ERISA defines "welfare benefit plan," it says nothing
about the terms "plan" or "program" within that definition. At
the very least, this is the type of close case where courts should
defer to the impartial governmental agency responsible for enforcing the statute.21 5
The Henning court accepted the plaintiffs' position that, even if
the Department of Labor regulation was valid, the regulation applied only to "discretionary" payments of vacation from general
assets.216 The regulation, however, contains no limitation as to
"discretionary" payments. Additionally, it is doubtful that employers with no obligation to provide for vacation pay would have
generated the inquiries to which the Secretary of Labor referred in
proposing adoption of the regulation. 217 There also is no evidence
that the Department of Labor has ever interpreted its regulation in
such a limited manner. 2 8 An administrative agency's interpreta-

tion of its own regulation is entitled to even greater deference than
210. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979);
see also National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp. 232, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal
docketed, No. 85-1263 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 1985) ("The administrative interpretation of
ERISA by those entrusted with its enforcement is entitled to great weight.")
211. Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1291, 1294, 1303, 1307 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-473,
96 Stat. 2612 (1983).
212. See National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477
(1979) (Court should look to "the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute"); see also EEOC v. Associcated Dry
Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981).
213. See New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973); see
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
214. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
215. LLC Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 537 F. Supp. 355, 360 (E.D. Mo.
1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 703 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1983).
216. Henning, 569 F. Supp. at 1546.
217. See supra note 38.
218. Id.
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its interpretation of a statute and must be "demonstrably irrational" before it will be overruled.21 9 It certainly was not "demonstrably irrational" for the Department of Labor to believe that its
regulations were not limited to discretionary payments.
The Henning Characterizationof "Relate To"
The Substantive Vacation Pay Regulations
If Congress had intended to include nontrusteed vacation payroll practices within ERISA's "welfare benefit plans," then the
Henning court would have been correct in holding that Labor
Code section 227.3, Suastez, and the California enforcement policy
"related to" such plans. By prohibiting forfeiture and requiring
proration, the California state laws effectively imposed vesting requirements on vacation plans or programs. Congress, however, exempted welfare benefit plans from ERISA's vesting requirements
and thus left such matters to "private choice." Accordingly, it
would follow that Congress chose to supplant state regulation of
vacation pay with a regulatory void.
This is true even though courts engaging in "conflict" analysis
would find such a result unpalatable.22 ° While "conflict" analysis
may have survived Alessi,22 1 it clearly was interred by Shaw. In
Shaw, the Supreme Court held unanimously that states may not
regulate welfare benefit plans even in those areas left untouched by
ERISA.222 To the extent that Shaw can be read as requiring some
conflict, that conflict was present in Henning, because the California laws prohibited practices "lawful under federal law," and federal law was silent as to such practices.223
The state vacation laws in Henning also would "relate to" the
plans under the reasoning of those courts and commentators who
would limit preemption to state laws which "regulate, directly or
'224
indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans.
The laws struck down in Henning were "directed" solely at vacation practices which the court deemed plans or programs and regulated terms and conditions such as vesting and rate of pay.
219. Horizon Mutual Sav. Bank v. FSLIC, 674 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1982).
220. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
222. Shaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2900.
223. See supra note 133.
224. ERISA § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1982); see supra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text.
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The State Administrative Adjudicatory Mechanisms
State laws creating administrative mechanisms for settling vacation claims do not "relate to" welfare benefit plans within the
meaning of ERISA's preemption section. Such laws merely carry
out Congress's grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the states over
claims for ERISA-covered benefits. 225 The Henning injunction,
however, removed California labor standards officials from the adjudication and collection of vacation pay claims. As Henning and
similar cases226 move toward their dates with the Supreme Court,
the real battles may be fought not over the rights of states to regulate the terms of vacation plans, but over state authority to settle
vacation pay claims in administrative forums. If the local grocer
refuses to pay the stock boy the week's vacation he has coming
when he quits, the Henning injunction would send the stock boy to
state or federal court, not to his state labor standards officials. This
is a result unsupported by either the language or the legislative history of ERISA and not mandated by any reasoned interpretation
of Shaw.
Any analysis of ERISA preemption of state administrative procedures should begin with consideration of Supreme Court guidelines. The Court in Shaw placed much emphasis on the
Conference Committee's rejection of narrower preemption provisions and the sponsor's comments on the final version.227 Yet
ERISA's final days in Congress illustrate what one commentator
has described as "recurrent problems" in the Court's handling of
"occupying the field" cases, specifically, the "reliance on unpersuasive and ill-considered remarks in the legislative history and the
generalization of a true congressional intent to cover cases unlike
225. ERISA § 502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1982); see supra note 76.
226. In National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. I11.1985), appeal
docketed, No. 85-1263 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 1985), the court held that ERISA does not
preempt Illinois' vacation pay law, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 39m-5 (1983), which is
virtually identical to the California statute struck down in Henning. The court called
Henning "a lone voice.., in direct contravention of the statute." Id. at 236. Two other
federal district courts, however, have held that ERISA preempts state regulation of severance payments from the general assets of an employer. Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc.,
No. 83-6954, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-7824 and No.
84-7908 (2d Cir. Oct. 10, 1984); Slack v. Burlington Indus., Inc., No. 83-274, slip op.
(M.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-2241 and No. 84-2257 (4th Cir. Nov.
14, 1984). An Illinois state court also has rejected ERISA preemption challenges to Illinois' vacation pay law. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Kilroy, No. 84-50308 (Cir. Ct.
Cook County Mar. 21, 1985); Golden Bear Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray, No. 8450307 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Mar. 21,1985); Bernardi v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.,
No. 83-53174 (Cir. Ct. Cook County Mar. 21, 1985).
227. Shaw, 103 S. Ct. at 2900-01.
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those considered by Congress."22 In the almost twenty months
that the 93d Congress considered the bills that became ERISA, the
legislators had the current preemption language before them for
less than two weeks. These two weeks, it should be noted, were the
weeks following President Nixon's resignation, a time when Congress may have been somewhat preoccupied.229
California's substantive vacation pay laws would have survived
either of the preemption provisions which the conferees took into
committee since both limited preemption to state laws conflicting
directly with ERISA provisions.23° In a departure from their own
rules, however, the legislators emerged not with a compromise between the House and Senate versions of similar limited scope, but
with the most sweeping preemption provision ever written by Congress. 23 1 Thus, a bill which would have preempted state laws relat-

ing to reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary requirements turned into
the bill which the Henning court used to deprive California labor
standards officials of all jurisdiction in vacation matters and to deprive California workers and employers of a relatively inexpensive
way to resolve relatively small claims. It is small wonder that several commentators have suggested that Congress did not understand or appreciate the impact of the new preemption language.232
The sponsors' comments relied upon in Shaw provide little support for the Henning court's sweeping injunction as to the state's
adjudicatory powers. In fact, the comments clearly reflect an intention to limit preemption to state regulation, not adjudication, of
vacation pay claims. Representative Dent spoke of "the reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of
employee benefit plans.' 2 3 3 Senator Williams said the conference

substitute was intended to "preempt the field for Federal regula228. Hirsch, supra note 56, at 548.
229. The House conferees submitted their report on August 12, 1974, and the House
passed the bill on August 20, 1974. The Senate conferees reported on August 13, 1974,
and the Senate passed the bill on August 22, 1974. 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
2, at 4277, 4655, 4721, 4835.
See generally Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulations under
ERISA, 62 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 116 (1976).
230. See supra note 122.
231. See Note, ERISA: Preemption of State Health Care Laws and Worker WellBeing, 1981 U. Ill. L.Rev. 825, 848.
232. Kilberg & Heron, supra note 31, at 391; Turza & Halloway, supra note 62, at
177.
233. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 4670.
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tions."234 Only Senator Javits mentioned "displacement of State
action in the field of private employee benefit plans,"' 23 but his remark followed his expression of concern about "endless litigation
over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation. 236 Consequently, it appears that the sponsors were concerned about state regulation of benefit plans, not state
investigation, conciliation, or adjudication.237 The conference
committee report, which was the only other guide to Congress's
intent, merely parroted the bill's language.238 In applying ERISA's
preemption provision to the Henning facts, it is thus clear that the
legislative history supports a narrow interpretation of ERISA preemption when considering nonregulatory state laws.
Although the Henning court erred in enjoining the adjudication
of vacation pay claims, it must be noted that the court was hardly
writing on a clean slate. Shaw had just come down and seemed to
require a broad reading of the phrase "relate to."' 239 As a result,
there was support for the court's finding that the state law authorizing assignments and investigations of vacation pay claims and
creating an adjudicative process to dispose of such claims had a
"connection with or reference to" 24° vacation benefit plans.
The Henning injunction, however, took the Shaw definition of
"relate to" to an extreme, logical enough, but not in keeping with
the actual holding of the case, its dicta, or ERISA itself. In Shaw,
the Court limited preemption to the state's prohibition of "practices that are lawful under federal law. ' 24 1 This tension between
state and federal schemes simply does not exist in connection with
the administrative functions outlawed by Henning. Section
502(e)(2) 242 grants "state courts of competent jurisdiction" authority to adjudicate claims for ERISA-covered benefits. In California,
the state administrative tribunal can function, in effect, as a lower
state court, issuing binding determinations which become final
234.
note 2,
235.
note 2,
236.
note 2,
237.
238.

120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
at 4745 (emphasis added).
120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
at 4771.
120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
at 4770 (emphasis added).
See supra note 137.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d CONG., 2d SEss. 383 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 4650.
239. See supra notes 120, 121 and accompanying text.
240. Shaw, 103 S. Ct. at 2900.
241. Id. at 2906.
242. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1982).
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judgments if not appealed.24 a The taking of an assignment 2 " or
investigating of a claim is nothing more than a preliminary step in
a state court collection action.
Moreover, even if section 502(e)(2) did not authorize the actions
forbidden in Henning, their effect on benefit plans would be "tenu'
ous, remote or peripheral,"245
at least as compared to the state
court action ERISA explicitly approves. Indeed, administrative
resolution probably would place less of a burden on benefit plans
than would a state or federal court action. Finally, ERISA section
506246 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to utilize the services of
state agencies in performing ERISA enforcement functions. This
hardly manifests a congressional animus toward state labor
agencies.
IMPACT

The Henning opinion and injunction removed the California labor commissioner from the vacation pay business. Should Henning become the law of the land, the preemption of vacation pay
regulation would have the greatest impact in those states which
actually attempt to influence in some way the provisions of vacation promises or policies. 247 The preemption of administrative resolution of vacation pay claims, however, would have a more
profound and widespread effect. Thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia currently assist employees in the collection of
vacation pay claims.248 Scope of authority and procedures differ
from state to state. Some states, like California, grant their state
243. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.1, 98.2 (West Supp. r984).
244. For an ERISA action in which a state sued an assignee see Cartledge v. Miller,
457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
245. Shaw, 103 S.Ct. at 2901 n.21.
246. 29 U.S.C. § 1136 (1982).
247. Illinois currently is the only state with a provision similar to the law struck
down in Henning. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 39m-5 (1983), which provides in relevant part:
Unless otherwise provided in a collective bargaining agreement, whenever a
contract of employment or employment policy provides for paid vacations, and
an employee resigns or is terminated without having taken all vacation time
earned in accordance with such contract of employment or employment policy,
the monetary equivalent of all earned vacation shall be paid to him or her as
part of his or her final compensation at his or her final rate of pay and no
employment contract or employment policy shall provide for forfeiture of
earned vacation time upon separation.
This provision has survived its first ERISA preemption challenge. See National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-1263 (7th
Cir. Feb. 15, 1985);'supra note 226.
248. See APPENDIX.
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labor agencies the power to make binding determinations.249 Other
states allow officials to take assignments of claims and file civil lawsuits. 250 Many states impose civil penalties or criminal sanctions
on employers who willfully refuse to pay vacation pay when due.251
If the Henning decision eliminates administrative handling of vacation pay claims, employees will be forced to file civil suits in state
or federal court. ERISA, however, provides no federal remedial
procedures like those offered by the states. In addition, the Department of Labor has no binding administrative enforcement powers,
and the statute contains no criminal sanctions for refusal to pay
vacation claims. In contrast to state procedures, which often result
in quick recovery with little expense, ERISA remedies could take
years. Under ERISA, a claimant would have to first exhaust internal claims procedures under the benefit plan before turning to an
often over-burdened civil court system.252
State agencies each year resolve more than 19,000 vacation pay
claims,

25 3

involving more than $7.5 million. 254 If vacation pay

claimants are forced to turn to the civil courts for relief, many may
simply abandon their claims rather than face the time and expense
of suing their former employers. Those that do make it to the
courthouse door may find themselves overmatched, because even
249. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.1 (West Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44322(d) (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-212 (1982); N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:11-58 (1972);
OR. REV. STAT. § 652.332(2) (1983).
250. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.05.220 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-312 (1976);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-72 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1113 (1975); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-608(a) (1968); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 388-11(d) (1976); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, 39m-11(b) (1983); IOWA CODE § 91A.10(1), (2) (Supp. 1984); KY. REV.
STAT. § 337.385(2) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 627 (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 100, § 94(g)(2) (Supp.1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-211 (1982); OR. REV.
STAT. § 652.330(b) (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-14-23 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-12
(1981).
251. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.05.280 (1984); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-4-109, 116,
117 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-17g (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 1112 (1975);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-603(d), 107 (1968); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 388-10 (Supp. 1983);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 39m-14 (1983); IOWA CODE § 91A.12 (Supp. 1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-323 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 337.385(1) (1983); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 626-A (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100 § 94(f)(1) (Supp. 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-206 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.10 (1972); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 40, § 165.3B, 165.8 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.150(b) (1983); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-14-17 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-15 (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 27-5-110
(1983).
252. Brief of Amici Curiae N.C. Dep't of Labor and N.Y. Dep't of Labor at 11-12,
California Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, No. 83-6381 and No. 83-6416 (9th Cir. Nov. 10,
1983).
253.
254.

See APPENDIX.
See APPENDIX.
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in those jurisdictions with pro se courts, claimants with no legal
training often will be up against skilled management attorneys.
Although ERISA does not provide criminal sanctions for an employer's refusal to pay, there is some chance that state criminal
penalties would survive Henning. During the final debate on
ERISA, Senator Javits remarked that the Act would supersede
state laws imposing criminal penalties for failure to make plan contributions, unless such laws were criminal statutes of general application. 2 55 However, no light was shed on which laws fell within

the exception. As a result, the courts are divided as to whether
state wage payment laws are "generally applicable criminal law[s]"
and thus saved from preemption under ERISA section 514(4).256

It is possible that, in future ERISA cases, some courts reviewing
Henning will simply hold that ERISA preempts state regulation of
vacation pay but allows states to continue to provide administrative forums for resolution of vacation pay claims. If this situation
were to arise, ERISA would limit such actions to recovery of benefits due under the terms of the vacation plan which gives rise to the
claim.257 Since ERISA imposes no vesting requirements on welfare
benefit plans,2 8 employers would have to pay vacation pay to employees who resign or who are fired only if their vacation plans
provide for vested vacation. No employer would be required by
statute to pay a pro rata share of vacation pay to employees who
leave before a full vacation is earned. If employees must base vaca255. 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 4771.
256. See Goldstein v. Mangano, 99 Misc. 2d 523, 531, 417 N.Y.S.2d 368, 374 (Sup.
Ct. 1978) (wage payment law is generally applicable because it "extends to the entire

State and embraces all persons or things of a particular class"); see also Carpenters
Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 282 n.5 (3rd Cir.
1983); National Metalcrafters v. McNeil, 602 F. Supp. 232, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1985), appeal
docketed, No. 85-1263 (7th Cir. Feb. 15, 1985); Sasso v. Vachris, 116 Misc. 2d 797, 800,
456 N.Y.S.2d 629, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1982). But see Commonwealth v. Federico, 383 Mass.
485, 490, 419 N.E.2d 1374, 1377 (1981) (exemption applies only to criminal laws which

apply to conduct generally); Baker v. Caravan Moving Corp., 561 F. Supp. 337, 341
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act not a "generally applicable"
state law).
257. See ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), (e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (e)(1) (1982). In
adjudicating vacation claims, state officials would have to apply the federal common law,
which provides that a decision to deny benefits will be overturned only "when '(1) arbitrary and capricious, (2) not supported by substantial evidence, or (3) erroneous on a
question of law.' " Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 710 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir. 1983)
(quoting Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 653 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1981)). The Wolfe

court noted, "This standard is*followed in all circuits which have addressed the question." Wolfe, 710 F.2d at 393 n.8 (citing decisions from all circuits except the sixth and
tenth).
258.

ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982).
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tion pay claims on ERISA, however, the federal courts will need to
develop a body of substantive common law which well might follow the lead provided by the California Supreme Court in Suastez. 25 9 While there is no federal statute prohibiting forfeiture of
vacation pay when an employee resigns or is terminated, ERISA
imposes upon plan fiduciaries the obligation to discharge their obligations "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and . . .for the exclusive purpose of . . .providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries. ' ' 2 6° Forfeiture could run afoul
of this provision. Consequently, the courts may find in ERISA the
same implicit prohibition against forfeiture which the California
Supreme Court found in section 227.3 when it required proration
in Suastez. The employer associations who sued in Henning thus
would end up with the same liability they sought to avoid in Henning and with the additional obligation of complying with
ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements.261
Courts reviewing ERISA preemption challenges to state vacation pay laws can avoid the Henning result simply by deferring to
the Department of Labor regulation on vacation payroll practices.262 Courts also can imply an exception to ERISA preemption,
similar to that found in other cases involving important state concerns which have only tangential effects on employee benefit
plans.263 If other courts accept the Henning rationale, Congress
will have no choice but to amend ERISA unless it wishes to leave
vacation pay provisions unregulated and vacation pay collection up
to the courts.2 4
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court preemption cases, including Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., establish conclusively that Congress had the power
259. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 31 Cal. 3d 774, 647 P.2d 122, 183 Cal. Rptr.
846 (1982); see supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
260. ERISA § 404 (a)(l)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(A)(i) (1982).
261. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1982).
262. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.31(b)(3)(i) (1984).
263. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
264. The National Association of Government Labor Officials has suggested the following addition to Section 514(a):
State laws prohibiting employers from discriminating in the provision of employee benefits, obligating employers to pay employee welfare benefits to its [sic]
employees and providing for the enforcement of such obligations shall not be
considered laws relating to an employee benefit plan. The foregoing sentence
shall not apply to employee pension benefit plans.
Resolution of the National Association of Government Labor Officials, 67th Annual
Convention, Tulsa, Okla., July 8, 1984, at 3.
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to occupy the field of employee benefit plans and to eliminate state
regulation even of those areas, like vacation pay, which ERISA
leaves virtually unregulated. There is, however, little support for
Henning's conclusion that vacation payments from general assets
constitute ERISA benefit plans. Without support from the structure of the Act or the legislative history, the Henning court gave
little deference to a longstanding construction of the statute by the
agency empowered to enforce it. Having reached out to find
ERISA coverage, the court went on to impose ERISA preemption
even broader than that required under Shaw.
Even if nontrusteed vacation arrangements are ERISA benefit
plans, the Henning court should have limited its injunction to the
substantive state laws. Instead, it eliminated an important state
service and dictated the manner in which California would exercise
its concurrent jurisdiction over benefit collection actions. Other
courts faced with similar cases should recognize the states' important interest in administrative regulation and adjudication of vacation pay. If they fail to do so, Congress should act to return to the
states their traditional role in enforcing minimum labor standards.
DONALD J. MCNEIL*
The author, a third-year evening student at Loyola University of Chicago School
of Law, is superintendent of the Wage Claims Division of the Illinois Department of
Labor. However, the views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Illinois Department of Labor. As a result of his
position as superintendent, the author is the named defendant in NationalMetalcrafters v.
McNeil, discussed supra notes 53, 184, 210, 226, 247, 256.
*
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APPENDIXa

State Assistance With Vacation Pay Claims
State

Assist with
Statutory Authority
vacation pay?

Ala.
Alaska

Yes

ALASKA STAT.

Ariz.

Yes

§ 23.05.210 (1984)
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-350, 23-356 (Supp.
1984)

Ark.

Yes

Cal.
Colo.

Noe
Yes

ARK. STAT. ANN.

§§ 81-311, 81-312 (1976)
See supra note 135
COLO. REv. STAT.

§§ 8-4-101, 8-4-111 (1974)d
Conn.

Yes

CONN. GEN. STAT.

No. of vacation $ volume year
pay claims/yearb (in thousands)b

200
10,000c
No figure
given
400

§ 31-76k (Supp. 1984)
Del.

DEL. CODE ANN.

D.C.

tit. 19, § 1109(b) (1975)
D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36.106 (1981)

Fla.
Ga.
Hawaii

HAWAI1 REv. STAT.

180

60
5,000C
No figure
given
No figure
given
50.9

20

6.5

100

45.2

50

No figure
given
74
2,775

§§ 388-4, 388-7(3) (1976)"
Idaho
Indiana
Ill.

Yes
Yes
Yes

IDAHO CODE

§ 45-615 (Supp. 1984)
f
ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 48,
Iowa

Yes

223
3,000

39m-5 (1983)

IOWA CODE

§§ 91A.2(4)(b), 91A.4
(Supp. 1984)
a. This chart contains the results of a survey conducted by the Illinois Department of
Labor in August 1984. Questionnaires were sent to state labor officials in each state and
the District of Columbia. The responses were not independently verified. The survey is
unpublished; however, copies of all completed questionnaires are on file in the Law Journal office of the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
b. With few easily recognizable exceptions, figures are approximate.
c. Permanently enjoined from accepting vacation pay claims by California Hosp. Ass'n
v. Henning, 569 F. Supp. 1544 (C.D. Cal. 1983), appeal docketed, No. 83-6381 and No.
83-6416 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 1983). Figures are pre-Henning.
d. State statute makes no mention of vacation pay. However, in Hartman v. Freedman,
591 P.2d 1318 (Colo. 1979), the Colorado Supreme Court held that vacation pay fell
within the statutory definition of "wages."
e. See also section 12-21-7 of Ch. 21, Administrative Rules.
f. State agency relies for authority on Die & Mold, Inc. v. Western, 448 N.E.2d 44 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983).
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g. State statute makes no specific mention of vacation pay. However, state courts have
held that vacation falls within the statutory definition of "wages." See, eg., Ridhardson
v. St. Mary Hosp., 6 Kan. App. 2d 238, 627 P.2d 1143, review denied, 229 Kan. 971
(1981).
h. Statute does not mention vacation pay but vacation pay claims are handled
informally.
i. State agency relies for authority on New Mexico Lab. & Indus. Comm'n ex reL Tolman v. Deming National Bank, No. 13401 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 1981), and Op. Att'y Gen.
62-69 (1962).
j. Figure includes claims for other "wage supplements."
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k. State agency relies for authority on State ex reL Hagen v. Bismarck Tire Center, Inc.
234 N.W.2d 224 (N.D. 1975).
1. Vacation pay handled only as a credit toward payment of prevailing wage violations.
m. State statute makes no mention of vacation pay. However, in State ex rel. Nilsen v.
Oregon Motor Ass'n, 248 Or. 133, 136, 432 P.2d 512, 514 (1967), the Oregon Supreme
Court held that vacation pay fell within the definition of "wages."
n. No state statute but vacation pay claims are handled informally.
o. State agency answered "No" in questionnaire but also indicated that when vacation
pay is part of a claim for back wages, vacation pay is included in initial investigation but
not pursued if employer does not agree to pay.
p. State agency relies for authority on Op. Att'y Gen. H-1138 (1978).
q. No specific authority for employees other than minors. See Indus. Comm'n of Utah
Order No. 5, art. 10 (1978). However, state Industrial Commission accepts wage claim
assignments for vacation pay.
r. Figure includes other benefits, such as sick pay and retirement fund monies.

